The narrative of our changing times

In his parliamentary declaration delivered three days after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Scholz sought to capture the shocking event with the term “Zeitenwende” (historical turning point). The expression has been used many times before to accurately describe moments of crisis and upheaval. The two relevant variants of meaning listed in the Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (DWDS) are revealing: on the one hand, the processual execution of a turning point, and on the other, the completed event.1   When using the term "Zeitenwende", we always mean, firstly, the totality of all areas of life that change abruptly, secondly, the sudden surprise caused by a visible event, and, thirdly, the resulting all-round new way of perceiving and evaluating things. In our case, for example, this means that all areas of life, from everyday life to world politics, are subjected to a reassessment, such as the question of precautions in the energy sector and the reweighting of Germany's foreign policy toward Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. The most obvious example of a changing attention economy due to an external event is, currently, the new perception of the military, for example, the upgrading of the Bundeswehr and the increased focus on military expertise, which has far-reaching consequences for the population.
 
In the first sentence of his speech, Scholz evokes the significant idea of a historical turning point and thus reacts to the catastrophe and crisis in Ukraine, which is rapidly materializing as a war, with a powerful narrative directed toward the future – a narrative that represents a legitimating strategy for a change in political action. Analyzing the “Zeitenwende narrative” from a narratological perspective, its structure can be determined by four essential elements: 
 
(1) The embedding of current events within a narrative process and narrative framework, which should contribute to the mitigation of the shock moment immediately after the outbreak of war; 
 
(2) The dynamic core existing in the relationship between past, present, and future. From the perspective of the present, the narrative refers from the past to the future and formulates a clear call to action, which has the character of an appeal; 
 
(3) Evoking a sense of the unheard-of, incomprehensible, in the Goethean sense "novellistic" event "novellistic" event According to Goethe, a novella is characterized by the fact that it recounts an "unheard-of event that has occurred", around which the plot of this rather short literary form is centered, and which often represents an important turning point or a central point of reference in the narrative. In Goethe's case, the focus is still on an unusual, even novel event. In the works of later authors, the key event can also be a conflict or an exceptional psychological situation faced by the protagonist, for example. :   the war of aggression, which almost nobody had expected; 

(4) the narrative volume, i.e., the co-development of the various dimensions of the concept of “Zeitenwende”, which will be analyzed below, including: time, turning point, past, present, future, the various actors involved, and respective implications.

The expression "Zeitenwende" has its cultural-historical roots in the contemporary historiography of the early 19th century and stems from journalistic discourse. In particular, the authors of Young Germany Young Germany “Young Germany" is the name given to a literary movement during the “Vormärz” period (1825-1848), which included authors such as Karl Gutzkow, Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne, Ludolf Wienbarg, Heinrich Laube and Theodor Mundt. These young authors opposed the restorative politics of their time and advocated a liberal world view; their writings were banned in December 1835. saw themselves as political historian-journalists, as "Zeitschriftsteller"2 (a pun that plays on two meanings – writers of periodical articles and “writers of the times”),  who could influence political decision-makers. Until then, time was considered a category in which something takes place. When Zeitschriftsteller speak of time, they mean the present – the (current) times. Young-German buzzwords such as “Leben”, “Handeln”, “Zukunft” (life, action, future) belong to this semantic field; composite terms such as “Zeitaufregung” (excitement of the times), “Zeitgeist” (spirit of the times), and “Zeitentwicklung” (current developments) also emerge. For the first time, time is viewed in perspective by the Young Germans to analyze their own present and actively influence the future. "Time is the form taken by change,"3   Gutzkow says, for example. Presupposing this active concept of time, “Zeitenwende” implies that something new occurs and emerges from active participation.

The narrative gains the character of an appeal through five mandates for action,4  but although the government can at least be credited with a relative success in terms of its practical implementation, the persistent criticism is: slowness, lack of concept, procrastination. This objectionable reticence is inherent in the chancellor's speech itself: "We are experiencing an historical turning point," he says by way of introduction, "and that means that the world after this will not be the same as the world before.”5  Apart from the expression "historical turning point," there is nothing to indicate a will to shape things. The word “experience” means "to be affected and by something acting from outside and to be impressed by the sensation of that" and further: "to be present, with great sympathy".6  "Sensation" and "sympathy" are concretized in Germany as compassion, pity, sadness, anger, as well as in hopes, wishes, and the fear of a nuclear escalation. So, the question arises as to whether Scholz, in using the composite term “Zeitenwende”, is combining a passive concept of time (something that merely happens) with the concept of a turning point, which implies dynamism, or whether he is not doing justice to the active concept of time.

 "Zeitenwende" in the structure of Scholz's sentence means, first of all, the present, which stands between the "world before" and the "world after". In addition, Scholz develops the idea as a sense-giving narrative in the crisis and catastrophe situation of the war of aggression, and: whoever "speaks of crisis diagnoses an emergency, a shortage of time, and the need for action".7  It is therefore crucial that we not only "experience" the present, which is described with the crisis and future-oriented narrative of the “historical turning point”, but that we also help to shape it and create a clear vision for "the world to come".

In political and public discourse, the following characteristic features go hand in hand with the narrative of an historical turning point:

(1) the disillusionment of previous basic assumptions regarding peaceful coexistence among European states,

(2) a new ethical discourse around values, and

(3) a binary reductionism.

In relation to 1), one of the essential elements of Scholz's Zeitenwende narrative is "the world before" together with its basic assumptions, narratives, and buzzwords, which have become disillusioned or eroded, such as "democratization," "change through trade" "change through trade" "Change through trade" (Wandel durch Handel) or "change through rapprochement" (Wandel durch Annäherung) refers to a political concept first formulated by Egon Bahr in 1963, which became the core of the new Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt's government (1969-1974). A policy of "change through rapprochement" aims to improve inter-state relations by intensifying communication and economic cooperation despite different political systems and views. , "the end of history" "the end of history" The "End of History" was postulated in 1989 by the political scientist Francis Fukuyama in view of the end of the Cold War and the supposed end of the conflict between opposing ideologies. The assumption was that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Western democratic, market-based political system would prevail in the long term. , and "lasting peace" in Europe.8  Confidence in a lasting European peace order has been replaced by an increased interest in security as a first priority.

In relation to 2), in the 3sat film "Zeitenwende,"9  philosopher M. May sees a connection between the Corona pandemic and the Ukraine war in that the pandemic led to a change in consciousness around social and societal interaction. Moral reasons played a role here for the first time. This new ethical style of thinking, he argues, led to Russia's invasion of Ukraine being judged strongly from a moral point of view, which is why there was agreement early on as to the roles of aggressor and victim. Since February 24, 2022, the narrative of evil has also been revived. This creates a link on a discursive level between the Russian war of aggression and the Nazi terror regime of 1933-1945.10

In relation to 3), in the May 2022 issue of his journal "kulturRevolution," discourse analyst Jürgen Link criticizes this normatively guided discourse of values as restricting "what is publicly sayable" and limiting the "flexible-normalistic discourse" of postmodernism, which is based on diversity and a variety of opinions. Link calls this procedure of the (alleged) restriction of what is publicly sayable "binary reductionism". It allows for the two unambiguous positions of for and against. There are the "protonormalists," who clearly declare their support for the country under attack, and the "flexible normalists," who take a relativizing position on the war.11

Link's argument is based on the narrative that the war in Ukraine is an escalated conflict that outsiders can pacify. It does not apply to the real war situation in Ukraine. The failure of all talks started before the beginning of the invasion and continuing to this day is rooted in the nature of this war, which was started with the intention of eradicating Ukrainian identity and annexing Ukrainian territory to Russia. Ukraine does not want this, and Russia does not want to let go of this goal. A discourse can only be as differentiated as the realities on which it is based.

The actors involved in the Zeitwende include, directly, the warring parties of Russia and Ukraine and, indirectly, the respective supporting states. The war motives, goals, and narratives articulated by Russia are exclusively backward-looking. Such past narratives cited by Putin include a common origin story in  and the Patriotic War embedded in Russia's collective memory. Putin calls the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century and reinterprets (with reference to the Cold War) his war of aggression on his neighboring country as a fight against an alleged Nazi regime in Ukraine, a proxy war against the collective West collective West A buzzword coined by Russian politicians and intellectuals and used in Russian political communication in the context of the conflict constellation between Russia and its allies on the one hand and Western states around the EU and the USA on the other, which has been intensifying since 2014. In the course of the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, the image of the "collective West" as an enemy has become part of the standard repertoire with which Russia seeks to denounce the policies of Western states. , or a preemptive war to preempt the threat of NATO. Putin fantasizes the country's future as the return of a glorious Russia that appropriates its neighboring states in the name of brotherhood.

In his article "Russian German Lesson" published in the FAZ, the Russian bestselling author Shishkin, who lives in Switzerland, demonstrates in a virtuoso manner and with recourse to various literary forms, the methods and conditions under which Putinism works. Shishkin combines excerpts from radio broadcasts and letters written by Thomas Mann to Hitler's Germany during World War II. In doing so, he replaces the word “German” with “Russian”. The result are sentences like the following: "The Russian people have a strong ability to put up with things, and since they do not love freedom [...] they will, despite their severe disillusionment, still feel better and more rightly in shape under the new, crudely disciplinary constitution."12  Shishkin's language experiment identifies Putin's Russia as an imitation of Hitler's Germany. The imitation, which is a recuring version of what has already existed, can be seen as a narrative for contemporary Russia, which concerns the three states of Russia, Germany, and Ukraine, and is contrary to the future-oriented narrative of the Zeitenwende.

Ukraine's war narratives are future narratives. The country is defending its sovereignty and freedom, as well as its desired future as a member of the EU. The war of aggression is a catalyst (imposed by Russia) for Ukraine's intended shaping of the future within and together with Europe. Thus, Ukraine appears to be the driving force behind the repositioning of Europe in an ongoing struggle between democratic and autocratic systems, and thus we can say that it is the real actor in this Zeitenwende. If it succeeds, Ukraine will be a constituent part of the "world to come". In this new constellation, a far-reaching political concept is necessary so that the crisis narrative of the "Zeitenwende" becomes a future narrative, which will give meaning to what is to come and will manifest as potential and investment in the future.

------------------- This article is part of a series of articles based on the conference German Narratives on Russia's War in Ukraine. The conference took place as part of the Volkswagen Foundation's War in Ukraine theme week from February 22 to 24, 2023 at Herrenhausen Palace in Hanover. The organizers: Dr. Cornelia Ilbrig (Lower Saxony Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Göttingen), Dr. Jana-Katharina Mende (Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg) and Prof. Dr. Monika Wolting (University of Wrocław). Both the conference and the translation of this article were made possible by the Volkswagen Foundation.